00:25:10 · Scott Nolan, John Collison
[00:25:10] S0: produce Completely different, and that's why all of the new SMRs, all the advanced reactor designs, specifically choose HALEU. Uh-huh. 19.75% just under 20, which is the cutoff for different regulation internationally and domestically. [00:25:24] S1: I see. 20% is the cutoff because beyond that, you're getting [00:25:28] S0: You're getting close. Too close. [00:25:29] S1: Yeah. Okay. That makes sense. Where are you guys in the development of the company? Like, we're talking a lot about the market. Yep. But how many people? Where... Like, do you have a bunch of uranium sitting in a warehouse somewhere? When do you enrich it? Just describe to me where you are on [00:25:44] S0: the journey. Yeah. So big picture, we started end of twenty twenty three. Today here we are almost three years later. The team is just over 200 people scaling pretty quickly. We have facilities in LA as headquarters in engineering. The facility that we're building is in Paducah, Kentucky so Western Kentucky and everything we're doing at the company is aimed towards bringing that online by the end of the decade. So that means licensing. We just submitted our NRC license last week. It means all engineering efforts. It means manufacturing, construction. Pretty much every piece of this is targeting that end of decade timeline. [00:26:32] S1: So you're delivering enriched uranium by the end of the [00:26:36] S0: Yes. [00:26:36] S1: The decade?
00:26:36 · John Collison, Scott Nolan
[00:26:36] S1: The decade? [00:26:37] S0: Yeah. And on the commercial side, all of our contracts are lined up against that date because we know that's when both, like, the ban on Russian uranium imports starts 01/01/2028. Utilities do have some inventory, they do have some other contracts that can see them through for a little bit, but we want to be online as soon as we can after that to help plug that gap which is about a quarter of U. S. Demand. And then all of the advanced reactors are are more or less targeting first deployments in 2829 commercially and then scaling up from there. So that's about the right time to be online for the market, and it's about as fast as we can go. [00:27:13] S1: You worked at SpaceX. Elon's companies have this green lights to Malibu concept with planning. The idea is, as I understand it, that it costs you time to plan kind of conservatively a timeline that you can hit because you're building in buffers Mhmm. Into the schedule. And instead, you should plan based on a green lights to Malibu. You know, what if all the traffic lights were green basis? Curious what you think of this phenomenon... This, you know, idea generally. But then, two, is this end of the decade a Elon style green lights to Malibu, we'll have FSD next year type timeline? Or is it a timeline you guys are actually gonna hit? [00:27:49] S0: This is one we'll actually hit. So that's our external timeline. This is, you know I see. We're speaking publicly. So you [00:27:54] S1: have secret internal timeline as well?
00:27:56 · Scott Nolan
[00:27:56] S0: Secret internal timeline is go as fast as we can.: Yeah.: And we do. Yeah, we do have an internal timeline.: Yeah.: Yeah, that schedule philosophy of green lights in Malibu, comes out of this idea that if you give people more time, they will simply take more time. Now there is a minimum. And there is, you can maybe go too quick and squeeze all time out of the schedule to the point where now you're doing things that are not in support of the correct architecture or a very long term cost structure. Mhmm. That's always the, you know, the critique. That is the tension. Yeah, that's the tension. That's even the internal tension at any company trying to run a green lights and Malibu schedule is number one, do you have waste? Number two do you make the wrong architectural decisions? And then number three like how do you manage people against this plan? So if you're doing performance based management and you give someone a very difficult plan that maybe is perfection it's more difficult to judge their performance against that. And so you have to have in your own mind like okay what's a little bit of buffer, what's a reasonable thing. But yeah it's often very useful. The Greenlights in Malibu is not only like a scheduling tool it's also a constraints tool of if we really try and dial this in and remove all buffer, what breaks? And so what's the thing that's actually the critical path that's preventing us from...: Ah, so it's a bottleneck discovery tool.: I think it can be when done properly. And then the critiques I raised, they can be dealt with in other ways if you're just like extremely exacting about, no, this is the architecture we're gonna do. And if leadership is very deep in the weeds on every engineering decision and can say, okay, we have this schedule but no one in the room thinks we should do this thing just to shave one day. Yes. Don't do that thing. Let's do it right. Let's take three days back. It's okay. We can make it up elsewhere. Mhmm. From
00:29:47 · John Collison, Scott Nolan
[00:29:47] S1: building great companies to investing in them, Scott Nolan knows both sides. And Stripe Press has two new books tackling each. First up, Built to Grow by Stephanie Friedman, the tactical playbook for building a sales engine from hire number one to a 100, and it's out right now. You can buy it. And then coming soon is Nomad Letters, collecting the insights of Nick Sleep and Qais Zakaria, fund managers who generated a 900% return in just thirteen years backing the relentless flywheels of companies like Amazon and Costco. So grab both at press.stripe.com. What did you work on SpaceX? [00:30:24] S0: SpaceX, when I started, I was just an intern Mhmm. 2003. [00:30:28] S1: Oh, but you were there really early. Yeah, pretty early.
00:30:28 · John Collison, Scott Nolan
[00:30:28] S1: Oh, but you were there really early. Yeah, pretty early. [00:30:31] S0: Yeah, one of the first So was founded in 'two? 'two. Yeah. Yep. So very, very lucky to graduate at the right time in aerospace where prior to SpaceX there wasn't too I much interesting to remember the first summer I was working on test stands. We were getting ready for an engine to be able to be mounted vertically and put on a test stand. First winter break was working on a surrogate for the engine and then after I graduated I worked on the engine systems. So the Merlin engine, a bunch of components on there. Didn't design it myself. Were much more experienced people doing that but I helped make sure that individual parts could withstand the thermal and structural loading. And then after that did a series of engines across a few vehicles including the Dragon capsule which at the time was just cargo. And I was part of the early team and got to work on a few subsystems there. So I was there 2003 to 2007. [00:31:26] S1: And I was struck in US manufacturing and Chinese manufacturing for that matter, how influential Elon's management style and philosophy has has been where, you know, most of the kind of companies founded later kind of explicitly reference some tenets. Mhmm. Just what has been influential for you in terms of design philosophies? [00:31:53] S0: Yeah. Well, I think the thing that I actually draw more out of the SpaceX experience is working on something that not everyone agrees is the most important thing. It kind of overlaps with Peter's Yes. Sort of philosophy. So...
00:31:53 · Scott Nolan, John Collison
[00:31:53] S0: Yeah. Well, I think the thing that I actually draw more out of the SpaceX experience is working on something that not everyone agrees is the most important thing. It kind of overlaps with Peter's Yes. Sort of philosophy. So... [00:32:07] S1: Picking up flying cars and not a 140 characters type problem? [00:32:10] S0: Yeah. Pick something that's almost like, in some ways, you know, what industries have not lived up to their promise over the last fifty years. What are the actual bottlenecks to these things like what are the markets that we know need fixing even if it sounded completely new greenfield sort of thing but that is a big lever on a much bigger industry. And so at the time early 2000s everybody was talking about modern satellites. How do you do smallsats? How do you do CubeSats? And then it turned out there was no good way for them to get to launch. When your satellite costs a billion dollars a 100,000,000 for a launch isn't so bad. When it costs $1,000,000,000 now you really need to think about it. And so it's almost the same thing. It's you know you have a small reactor SMR small modular reactor and now you're no longer doing a you know multi billion dollar construction project but now you need the fuel. And in fact the fuel cost matters proportionately more to where some of these SMRs their total LCOE could be 50% fuel cost within Richmond. It's that high. In some cases. Yeah. It depends on the exact design, but at today's market prices it can be. So... [00:33:23] S1: LCOE is levelized cost of energy, like, but basically the energy cost, right?